#### **IM 7011: Information Economics**

Lecture 7: Adverse Selection: Screening Two-type Models: Taylor and Xiao (2009)

Ling-Chieh Kung

Department of Information Management National Taiwan University

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# Introduction

- ▶ In this lecture, we discuss Taylor and Xiao (2009).<sup>1</sup>
- ▶ While it is an application of the two-type model, it has:
  - Supply chain coordination.
  - Rebates and returns contracts.
  - Endogenous adverse selection.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Taylor, T., W. Xiao. 2009. Incentives for Retailer Forecasting: Rebates vs. Returns. *Management Science* **55**(10) 1654–1669.

(7) Screening: Taylor and Xiao (2009) └─ Introduction and model

# Road map

#### ▶ Introduction and model.

- ▶ Integrated system.
- Rebates contracts.
- ▶ Returns contracts.

# **Demand forecasting**

- Supply-demand mismatch is costly.
- ▶ Firms try to do **forecasting** to obtain demand knowledge.
- ▶ In a supply chain, typically the retailer does forecasting.
  - ▶ The manufacturer may only **induce** the retailer to forecast.
  - ▶ It is also the retailer that incurs the forecasting cost.
  - ▶ We shall study how the **forecasting cost** affects the supply chain.
- ▶ Is it always beneficial to induce forecasting?
  - ▶ Forecasting allows the supply chain to reduce supply-demand mismatch.
  - ▶ It also places the manufacturer at an **informational disadvantage**!
- ▶ If inducing forecasting is beneficial, when? How?

(7) Screening: Taylor and Xiao (2009) └─ Introduction and model

# **Contract formats**

- ▶ Whether inducing/encouraging forecasting is beneficial depends on how the system profit is split.
  - ▶ The **contract format** between the manufacturer and retailer matters.
- ▶ Two kinds of contracts alters the retailer's decision of forecasting.
- ▶ Under a **rebates** contract, the manufacturer pays a bonus to the retailer for each sold unit.
  - A rebates contract provides a **lottery** to the retailer.
  - ▶ It **encourages** the retailer to forecast.
- ▶ Under a **returns** contract, the manufacturer buys back unsold units.
  - ▶ A returns contract provides an **insurance** to the retailer.
  - ▶ It **discourages** the retailer to forecast.
- ▶ Which contract format is more beneficial for the manufacturer?

# Demand forecasting

- ▶ A manufacturer (he) sells to a retailer (she), who faces uncertain consumer demands.
- The unit production cost is c and unit retail price is p.
- Without forecasting, firms believe that the random demand  $D_N \sim F_N$ .
- The retailer may **forecast** with a forecasting cost k.
- ▶ If she forecasts, she obtains a **private** demand **signal**  $S \in \{H, L\}$ .
- With probability  $\lambda$ , she observes a favorable signal:
  - S = H makes the retailer **optimistic**.
  - She believes that the market is good and the updated demand  $D_H \sim F_H$ .
- With probability  $1 \lambda$ , she observes a unfavorable signal:
  - S = L makes the retailer **pessimistic**.
  - ▶ She believes that the market is bad and the updated demand  $D_L \sim F_L$ .
- We assume that  $F_H(x) \leq F_L(x)$  and  $F_N(x) = \lambda F_H(x) + (1 \lambda)F_L(x)$  for all  $x \geq 0$ . We also assume that  $F(\cdot)$  is strictly increasing.
- Let  $\overline{F}_S(x) := 1 F_S(x), S \in \{H, L, N\}.$

## An example for demand forecasting

▶ As an example, suppose that  $D_L \sim \text{Uni}(0, 1)$  and  $D_H \sim \text{Uni}(0, 2)$ , i.e.,

$$F_L(x) = \begin{cases} x & \forall x \in [0,1] \\ 1 & \forall x \in (1,2] \end{cases} \quad \text{and} \quad F_H(x) = \frac{x}{2} \quad \forall x \in [0,2].$$

- The market is either good or bad. If it is good, the demand is  $D_H$ . Otherwise, it is  $D_L$ .
- We may say that the demand  $D(\theta) \sim \text{Uni}(0, \theta)$ , where  $\theta \in \{1, 2\}$ .
- ▶ The firms both believe that  $Pr(\theta = 2) = \lambda = 1 Pr(\theta = 1)$ .
- Without knowing  $\theta$ , a firm can only believe that the demand is  $D_N \sim F_N = \lambda F_H + (1 \lambda) F_L.$

• If the retailer forecasts, she knows  $\theta$  and thus whether it is  $D_H$  or  $D_L$ .

## Contractual terms: rebates contracts

▶ By offering a rebates contract, the manufacturer specifies a three-tuple

- ► q is the order **quantity**.
- r is the sales **bonus** per unit sales.<sup>2</sup>
- t is the **transfer** payment.
- If the retailer accepts the contract, she pays t to purchase q units and the rebate r.
- ▶ Note that the manufacturer is not restricted to sell the products at a wholesale price.
  - If this is the case, he will specify (q, r, w) where t = wq.
  - ▶ To find the optimal rebates contract, such a restriction should not exist.
  - t may depend on q and r in any format.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Note that this is a *linear rebate*. Target rebates are not discussed in this paper.

#### Contractual terms: returns contracts

▶ By offering a rebates contract, the manufacturer specifies a three-tuple

(q, b, t).

- ► q is the order **quantity**.
- b is the **buy-back price** per unit of unsold products.<sup>3</sup>
- t is the **transfer** payment.
- If the retailer accepts the contract, she pays t to purchase q units and the buy-back price b.
- ▶ The manufacturer is still not restricted to sell the products at a wholesale price.
  - t may depend on q and b in any format.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Note that all unsold products can be returned. *Partial returns* are not discussed in this paper.

# The manufacturer's contract design problem

- ► Note that we assume that the manufacturer can offer a **take-it-or-leave-it** contract.
  - ▶ The retailer cannot choose quantities at her disposal.
  - ► She can only **accept of reject** the contract.
  - ▶ Her information makes her accept-or-reject decision more accurate.
- ▶ If the retailer does not forecast, a single contract is enough.
  - ▶ There is no information asymmetry.
  - Enough flexibility is ensured by the flexibility on t.
- ► If the retailer has private information (signal S), a menu of contracts should be offered to induce truth-telling.
  - As S is binary, a menu of two contracts is optimal.
- ▶ We assume that the manufacturer **cannot mix** rebates and returns.
  - ▶ We will see that mixing does not make the manufacturer better off.
- ► The retailer determines whether to obtain private information. This is a problem with **endogenous adverse selection**!

# Timing

- ▶ The sequence of events is as follows:
  - 1. The manufacturer offers a (menu of) rebates or returns contract(s).
  - 2. The retailer decides whether to forecast. If so, she privately observes the demand signal.
  - 3. The retailer chooses a contract or reject the offer based on her signal.
  - 4. Demand is realized and payments are made.
- ▶ The manufacturer **can induce** the retailer to or not to forecast.
  - ▶ Whether the retailer forecasts is also private. However, the manufacturer can anticipate this.
- ► Alternative timing (not discussed in this paper):
  - The retailer forecasts after choosing a contract  $(1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow 4)$ .
  - The retailer forecasts before getting the offer  $(2 \rightarrow 1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 4)$ .

# Research questions revisited

- ▶ Should the manufacturer induce the retailer to forecast?
- ▶ If so, how the manufacturer design the offer?
- ▶ Which type of contracts, rebates or returns, is more beneficial?
- ▶ Efficiency? Inefficiency? Incentives? Information?

(7) Screening: Taylor and Xiao (2009) └\_Integrated system

# Road map

- ▶ Introduction and model.
- ► Integrated system.
- Rebates contracts.
- ▶ Returns contracts.

# Integrated system without forecasting

- ▶ As a benchmark, let's first analyze the first-best situation: integration.
  - ▶ The decisions: (1) forecasting or not and (2) production quantity.
  - ▶ These decisions will be compared to determine efficiency.
- ▶ Suppose the system chooses not to forecast, it solves

 $\Pi_N(q_N) := p \mathbb{E} \min(q_N, D_N) - cq_N.$ 

The optimal quantity is  $q_N^I = \bar{F}_N^{-1}(\frac{c}{p})$ .

• The optimized expected system profit is  $\Pi_N(q_N^I)$ .

## Integrated system with forecasting

Suppose the system chooses to forecast, it solves

$$\Pi_F(q_H, q_L) := \lambda \Big[ p \mathbb{E} \min(q_H, D_H) - c q_H \Big] \\ + (1 - \lambda) \Big[ p \mathbb{E} \min(q_L, D_L) - c q_L \Big].$$

The optimal quantities are  $q_S^I = \bar{F}_S^{-1}(\frac{c}{p}), S \in \{H, L\}.$ 

- ▶ By observing different signals, the quantity can be **adjusted** accordingly.
- If no adjustment, i.e.,  $q_H = q_L = q$ , then forecasting brings no benefit:

$$\Pi_F(q,q) = \Pi_N(q) \quad \forall q \ge 0.$$

• The optimized expected system profit is  $\Pi_F(q_H^I, q_L^I)$ .

# Integrated system: forecasting or not?

► If forecasting is free, the system should **always forecast**:

$$\Pi_F(q_H^I, q_L^I) \ge \Pi_F(q_N^I, q_N^I) = \Pi_N(q_N^I).$$

• However, forecasting requires a cost k.

- Whether the system should forecast depends on the value of k.
- ► The **performance gap**  $k^I := \prod_F (q_H^I, q_L^I) \prod_N (q_N^I)$  is the threshold.

#### Proposition 1

If  $k < k^{I}$ , the system should forecast and produce  $q_{H}^{I}(q_{L}^{I})$  upon observing signal H(L). Otherwise, the system should not forecast and should produce  $q_{N}^{I}$ .

# Road map

- ▶ Introduction and model.
- ▶ Integrated system.
- ► Rebates contracts.
- ▶ Returns contracts.

## **Rebates contracts**

- Here we study the manufacturer's optimal strategy for offering rebates contracts.
- ▶ He has two options:
  - ▶ Inducing the retailer to forecast.
  - ▶ Inducing the retailer not to forecast.
- ▶ We will first find the optimal contracts in either case. Then we make comparisons to obtain the manufacturer's optimal strategy.
- ▶ In all equilibria, the retailer will accept a contract. Let

$$R^r(S,C) := (p+r_C)\mathbb{E}\min(q_C, D_S) - t_C,$$

be the retailer's expected profit when:

- ▶ she observes signal  $S \in \{N, H, L\}$  (N for no forecasting) and
- she chooses **contract**  $(q_C, r_C, t_C), C \in \{N, H, L\}.$

# No forecasting

- ▶ Suppose the manufacturer wants to drive the retailer not to forecast.
  - He will offer a single contract  $(q_N, r_N, t_N)$ .
- ▶ Among rebates contracts that induce no forecasting, which is optimal?
- ▶ By accepting  $(q_N, r_N, t_N)$  with no forecasting, the retailer earns

$$R^{r}(N,N) := (p+r_N)\mathbb{E}\min(q_N, D_N) - t_N.$$

 However, she may choose to forecast and then accept or reject the offer based on her signal. If she forecasts, the retailer earns

 $\lambda \max\{R^{r}(H,N),0\} + (1-\lambda)\max\{R^{r}(L,N),0\} - k.$ 

- ▶ With probability  $\lambda$  she will observe S = H. She then determine whether to accept (and earn  $R^{r}(H, N)$ ) or reject (and earn 0).
- With probability  $1 \lambda$  she will observe S = L.
- In both cases, she pays k for forecasting.

# No forecasting: formulation

▶ To optimally induce no forecasting, the manufacturer solves

$$\max_{q_N, r_N, t_N} \quad t_N - cq_N - r_N E \min\{q_N, D_N\}$$
  
s.t. 
$$R^r(N, N) \ge \lambda \max\{R^r(H, N), 0\}$$
$$+ (1 - \lambda) \max\{R^r(L, N), 0\} - k$$
$$R^r(N, N) \ge 0.$$

- ▶ The first constraint ensures that the retailer prefers no forecasting.
- ▶ The second constraint ensures that the retailer will participate.
- ▶ **Incentives** are provided through contracts.
- ▶ Technical assumptions:
  - ▶ Naturally,  $q_N \ge 0$  and  $r_N \ge 0$  though not explicitly specified.
  - It is assumed that  $t_N \in \mathbb{R}$ . Money may transfer in **either direction**!

# No forecasting: solution

#### Proposition 2

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The optimal rebates contract inducing no forecasting is

_	k	$q_N^*$	$r_N^*$	$t_N^*$
	$k \leq \Gamma(q_L^I)$	$q_L^I$	0	$pE\min(q_L^I, D_N) - \frac{\Gamma(q_L^I) - k}{1 - \lambda}$
	$k\in (\Gamma(q_L^I),\Gamma(q_N^I))$	$\Gamma^{-1}(k)$	0	$pE\min(\Gamma^{-1}(k), D_N)$
	$k \ge \Gamma(q_N^I)$	$q_N^I$	0	$pE\min(q_N^I, D_N)$

- The optimal contract depends on k.
- ▶ It is ugly, but it can be found.

# No forecasting: intuitions

k	$q_N^*$	$r_N^*$	$t_N^*$
$k \leq \Gamma(q_L^I)$	$q_L^I$	0	$pE\min(q_L^I, D_N) - rac{\Gamma(q_L^I) - k}{1 - \lambda}$
$k\in (\Gamma(q_L^I),\Gamma(q_N^I))$	$\Gamma^{-1}(k)$	0	$pE\min(\Gamma^{-1}(k), D_N)$
$k\geq \Gamma(q_N^I)$	$q_N^I$	0	$pE\min(q_N^I, D_N)$

- ▶ A rebate encourages forecasting so **no rebate** should be offered.
- A large quantity encourages forecasting so q increases in k.
  - When k is large, it is easy to induce no forecasting.
  - ▶ The manufacturer can implement the efficient quantity  $(q_N^I)$  and capture all the surplus by the transfer.
  - $\blacktriangleright$  When k is moderate, it is not too hard to induce no forecasting.
  - The manufacturer captures all the surplus with a **reduced quantity**.
  - When k is small, it is hard to induce no forecasting.
  - The manufacturer must leave some rents to the retailer by reducing t.

# No forecasting: intuitions

- The retailer is "advantageous" when k is small. Does that make sense?
- ▶ The retailer gets rents though she does not have private information.
  - ▶ The **threat** of obtaining private information can generate rents!
- The power of threat depends on k:
  - ▶ When k is large, the threat is **weak** (noncredible). The manufacturer can be mean to the retailer (and use the transfer to extract everything).
  - When k is small, the threat is **strong** (credible). The manufacturer must be generous to the retailer.
- We may verify that the manufacturer's expected profit increases in k.
  - This is true if, and only if, he is required to induce no forecasting.

# Forecasting

▶ Suppose the manufacturer wants to induce forecasting.

- The retailer will have the private demand signal.
- ▶ A menu of two contracts  $\{(q_H, r_H, t_H), (q_L, r_L, t_L)\}$  will be offered.
- ▶ Now the manufacturer must ensures four things:
  - ▶ Once the retailer forecasts, she will select the intended contract.
  - ▶ Selecting the intended contract leaves the retailer a nonnegative profit.
  - ▶ The retailer must prefer forecasting to no forecasting.
  - ▶ Forecasting leaves the retailer a nonnegative profit.

#### Forecasting: formulation

▶ To optimally induce forecasting, the manufacturer solves

$$\begin{split} \max_{\substack{(q_H, r_H, t_H) \\ (q_L, r_L, t_L)}} & \lambda \Big[ t_H - cq_H - r_H E \min\{q_H, D_H\} \Big] \\ & + (1 - \lambda) \Big[ t_L - cq_L - r_L E \min\{q_L, D_L\} \Big] \\ \text{s.t.} & R^r(H, H) \geq R^r(H, L), \quad R^r(L, L) \geq R^r(L, H) \\ & R^r(H, H) \geq 0, \quad R^r(L, L) \geq 0 \\ & \lambda R^r(H, H) + (1 - \lambda) R^r(L, L) - k \geq R^r(N, H) \\ & \lambda R^r(H, H) + (1 - \lambda) R^r(L, L) - k \geq R^r(N, L) \\ & \lambda R^r(H, H) + (1 - \lambda) R^r(L, L) - k \geq 0 \end{split}$$

- ▶ The first two IC constraints ensure truth-telling after forecasting.
- ▶ The next two IR constraints ensure participation after forecasting.
- ▶ The last three IC and IR constraints ensure forecasting.

# Forecasting: solution

#### Proposition 3

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The optimal rebates contract inducing forecasting is

$$\begin{aligned} q_{L}^{*} &= \operatorname*{argmax}_{q \geq 0} \left\{ p \int_{0}^{q} [\bar{F}_{L}(x) - \lambda \bar{F}_{H}(x)] dx - (1 - \lambda) cq \right. \\ r_{L}^{*} &= 0 \\ t_{L}^{*} &= pE \min(q_{L}^{*}, D_{L}) \\ q_{H}^{*} &= q_{H}^{I} \\ r_{H}^{*} &= \frac{k}{\lambda(1 - \lambda)\Delta(q_{H}^{I})} \\ t_{H}^{*} &= (p + r_{H}^{*}) E \min(q_{H}^{*}, D_{H}) - p\Delta(q_{L}^{*}) - \frac{k}{\lambda} \\ e \ \Delta(q) &:= \mathbb{E} \Big[ \min(q, D_{H}) - \min(q, D_{L}) \Big]. \end{aligned}$$

# Forecasting: intuition

- ▶ Whenever we want to differentiate agents through contract design, we need to provide incentives for them to tell the truth.
- Who has the incentive to lie?
  - ► A retailer always **tends to claim** that the market is **bad** to get generous contracts.
  - ▶ The high-type retailer wants to pretend to be the low-type one.
- That is why we have  $r_H^* > r_L^* = 0$  and  $q_H^I = q_H^* > q_L^*$ .
  - ▶ An optimistic retailer likes rebates and high quantity.
  - ➤ To prevent her from mimicking the low type, the manufacturer cuts down r<sup>\*</sup><sub>L</sub> and q<sup>\*</sup><sub>L</sub>.
  - Efficiency at top:  $q_H^I = q_H^*$ .
  - Monotonicity:  $q_H^* > q_L^*$ .
  - ▶ No rent at bottom can also be verified.
  - ▶  $r_L^* = 0$ : There is no point to offer a rebate to the low-type retailer.

# Inducing forecasting or not


- ▶ We can find  $\mathcal{M}_F^r(k)$  and  $\mathcal{M}_N^r(k)$ , the manufacturer's expected profit, as a function of k, when the retailer is induced to or not to forecast.
- Forecasting should be induced if and only if  $\mathcal{M}_F^r(k) > \mathcal{M}_N^r(k)$ .
- ▶ It can be verified that:
  - ▶ When k = 0,  $\mathcal{M}_F^r(0) \ge \mathcal{M}_N^r(0)$ : Inducing no forecasting is too costly when forecasting is free.
  - When k goes up,  $\mathcal{M}_F^r(k)$  decreases (inducing forecasting becomes more costly) and  $\mathcal{M}_N^r(k)$  increases (inducing no forecasting becomes easier).
- ▶ Therefore, there exists a unique threshold  $k^r \ge 0$  such that

$$\mathcal{M}_F^r(k) > \mathcal{M}_N^r(k) \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad k < k^r.$$

▶ Induce forecasting if and only if the **forecasting cost is low**.


## Impact of the forecasting cost

▶ The manufacturer may **prefer** a retailer with a **high** forecasting cost.



# Impact of the forecasting cost


▶ The retailer may also **benefit** from a **high** forecasting cost.



(Figure 1b in Taylor and Xiao (2009))

# Impact of the forecasting cost

- ▶ Rebates contracts may not coordinate the supply chain  $(k^I \neq k^r)$ .
- ▶ The system may **benefit** from a **high** forecasting cost.



(Figure 1c in Taylor and Xiao (2009))

# Summary for rebates contracts

- Manufacturers should not blindly seek out retailers with low forecasting cost.
  - ▶ It is easier for a better-forecasting retailer to get information advantage
- ▶ Retailers should not blindly reduce the forecasting cost.
  - Especially if the reduction crosses the threshold  $k^r$ .
- ▶ In practice, a manufacturer may reduce a retailer's forecasting cost.
  - ▶ He should do that only when the retailer is already good at forecasting.
- ▶ Note that all these conclusions are made when the manufacturer is restricted to rebates contracts.
  - ▶ How about returns contracts?
  - ▶ How about optimal contracts?

(7) Screening: Taylor and Xiao (2009) ∟ Returns contracts

# Road map

- ▶ Introduction and model.
- ▶ Integrated system.
- ▶ Rebates contracts.
- ► Returns contracts.

## **Returns contracts**

- Here we study the manufacturer's optimal strategy for offering returns contracts.
- ▶ He may still chooses to induce the retailer to or not to forecast.
- ▶ In all equilibria, the retailer will accept a contract. Let

$$R^b(S,C) := p\mathbb{E}\min(q_C, D_S) + b_C\mathbb{E}\max(q_C - D_S, 0) - t_C,$$

be the retailer's expected profit when she observes signal  $S \in \{N, H, L\}$  and chooses contract  $(q_C, b_C, t_C), C \in \{N, H, L\}$ .

# No forecasting

- ▶ Suppose the manufacturer wants to drive the retailer not to forecast.
  - He will offer a single contract  $(q_N, b_N, t_N)$ .
- ▶ Among returns contracts that induce no forecasting, which is optimal?
- ▶ Inducing the retailer not to forecast is surprisingly simple. Just provide a **full insurance**!
  - ▶ A contract satisfying (q, b, t) = (q, p, pq) is a **full-returns** contract.<sup>4</sup>
  - ▶ Under a full-returns contract, the retailer has **no incentive to forecast**.
- ▶ The retailer **earns nothing** under a full-return contract.
- If the manufacturer offers the efficient quantity  $q^I$ , the manufacturer's expected profit is maximized to the expected system profit.
- The optimal returns contract is  $(q_N^I, p, pq_N^I)$ .

 $<sup>^4 \</sup>mathrm{In}$  Pasternack (1985), this is called a *full-credit* return contract.

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# Forecasting: formulation

- ▶ If the manufacturer wants to induce forecasting, he should offer a menu of two contracts  $\{(q_H, b_H, t_H), (q_L, b_L, t_L)\}$ .
- ▶ To optimally induce forecasting, the manufacturer solves

$$\max_{\substack{q_H, b_H, t_H \\ q_L, b_L, t_L \end{pmatrix}} \lambda \left[ t_H - cq_H - b_H E \max\{q_H - D_H, 0\} \right] \\ + (1 - \lambda) \left[ t_L - cq_L - b_L E \max\{q_L - D_L, 0\} \right] \\ \text{s.t.} \quad R^b(H, H) \ge R^b(H, L), \quad R^b(L, L) \ge R^b(L, H) \\ R^b(H, H) \ge 0, \quad R^b(L, L) \ge 0 \\ \lambda R^b(H, H) + (1 - \lambda) R^b(L, L) - k \ge R^b(N, H) \\ \lambda R^b(H, H) + (1 - \lambda) R^b(L, L) - k \ge R^b(N, L) \\ \lambda R^b(H, H) + (1 - \lambda) R^b(L, L) - k \ge 0$$

(7) Screening: Taylor and Xiao (2009) ⊢ Returns contracts

## Forecasting: solution

▶ The optimal returns contract inducing forecasting is

$$\begin{split} q_{L}^{*} &= q_{L}^{I} \\ b_{L}^{*} &= p \\ t_{L}^{*} &= p q_{L}^{I} \\ q_{H}^{*} &= \max\{q_{H}^{I}, \Gamma^{-1}(k)\} \\ b_{H}^{*} &= 0 \\ t_{H}^{*} &= pE \min\left\{\max\{q_{H}^{I}, \Gamma^{-1}(k)\}, D_{H}\right\} - k/\lambda \end{split}$$

- ► The manufacturer should offer a **no-returns** (full-returns) contract for the optimistic (pessimistic) retailer.
- Efficiency at bottom, not at top!
- We need to discourage the retailer from doing no forecast but selecting  $(q_H^*, b_H^*, t_H^*)$ . Upwards distorting  $q_H$  is effective: A retailer select a high-quantity contract only if she is optimistic enough.

# Forecasting: surplus extraction

▶ It can be shown that the retailer still **earns nothing** when the manufacturer wants to induce forecasting.

► Why?

- ▶ The retailer may earn rents because she can **mimic** the low type when she is actually of the high type.
  - ► However, the full-returns contract leaves the retailer no surplus regardless of her type.
  - ▶ The manufacturer thus does not need to worry about the mimicking.
  - ► The retailer **has no informational advantage** even though she has private information!

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# Inducing forecasting or not

- ▶ Again, there is a unique threshold that determines whether the manufacturer should induce the retailer to forecast.
- (Most) surprisingly, the threshold is **always** identical to  $k^{I}$ , the threshold for the integrated system!

#### Proposition 4 (Proposition 6 in Taylor and Xiao (2009))

By offering a returns contract, manufacturer should induce for ecasting if and only if  $k < k^{I}$ .

- If  $k \ge k^I$ , a single full-returns contract is offered.
- If  $k < k^{I}$ , a full-returns contract and a no-returns contract are offered.

In either case, the manufacturer's expected profit is the integrated system expected profit.

# Inducing forecasting or not: intuition

- ▶ Full-returns contracts are too powerful!
- ▶ The manufacturer adopts the following strategy:
  - ▶ Always offer a full-returns contract to extract all the surplus from a type-N or type-L retailer.
  - $\blacktriangleright$  Then the type-H also loses her informational advantage.
  - ▶ All I need to worry about is to induce forecasting when I should.
  - Offering a risky no-return contract with a large quantity encourages the retailer to forecast.

#### ► Screening is not a problem. Inducing information acquisition is.

- ► However:
  - The retailer's threat of not to forecast is credible only if k is small.
  - $\blacktriangleright$  But when k is small, the manufacturer prefers the retailer to forecast.
  - ▶ The threat is strong only when the manufacturer does not care about it.
- ▶ The key difference between rebates and returns is that screening is a problem when using rebates contracts.

# Conclusions

- ▶ A supply chain in which the retailer may forecast or not is studied.
- ▶ Two types of contracts, rebates contracts and returns contracts, are analyzed and compared.
- ▶ From the manufacturer's perspective, returns contracts are better.
- ▶ In fact, returns contracts are optimal and coordinating.