## Information Economics, Fall 2015 Pre-lecture Problems for Lecture 9

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Note. The deadline of submitting the pre-lecture problem is 9:20am,  $November\ 23,\ 2015$ . Please submit a hard copy of your work to the instructor in class. Late submissions will not be accepted. Each student must submit her/his individual work. Submit ONLY the problem that counts for grades.

- 1. (0 points) The probability of tossing an unfair coin and get a head is p. We know that  $p \in \{0.3, 0.5\}$ , but we do not know its exact value. Our prior belief on p is  $\Pr(p = 0.3) = 0.2 = 1 \Pr(p = 0.5)$ . Let X be 1 if we get a head after one toss and 0 otherwise.
  - (a) Find the following conditional probabilities: Pr(X = 1|p = 0.5) and Pr(X = 0|p = 0.3)
  - (b) Find the following joint probabilities: Pr(X = 1, p = 0.5) and Pr(X = 0, p = 0.3)
  - (c) If we toss once and get X=0, find the posterior distribution of p:  $\Pr(p=0.3|X=1)$  and  $\Pr(p=0.5|X=1)$ .
- 2. (0 points) Consider the warranty example introduced in the video.
  - (a) Explain why ((1,0),(B,N),(1,0)) is an equilibrium (cf. page 21 of the slides).
  - (b) Explain why ((0,1),(N,B),(0,1)) is not an equilibrium (cf. page 22 of the slides).
  - (c) Explain why  $((1,1),(B,B),(\frac{1}{2},[0,1]))$  is not an equilibrium (cf. page 23 of the slides).
  - (d) Explain why  $((1,1),(B,N),(\frac{1}{2},[0,1]))$  is not an equilibrium (cf. page 23 of the slides).
  - (e) Explain why  $((0,0),(B,N),([\frac{1}{3},1],\frac{1}{2}))$  is not an equilibrium (cf. page 24 of the slides).
  - (f) Explain why  $((0,0),(N,N),([0,\frac{1}{3}],\frac{1}{2}))$  is an equilibrium (cf. page 24 of the slides).
- 3. (10 points) Consider the warranty example introduced in the video. Suppose that the unreliable firm now earns 1 (instead of −1 of offering a warranty and having the customer buying the product. Will this signaling game has a separating equilibrium? Prove your arguments.