# Information Economics, Fall 2016 <br> Suggested Solution for Problem Set 1 

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1. (a) $\nabla f\left(x_{1}, x_{2}\right)=\left[\begin{array}{c}10 x_{1}^{4}+6 x_{1} x_{2}+3 \\ 3 x_{1}^{2}-3 x_{2}^{3}\end{array}\right], \nabla^{2} f\left(x_{1}, x_{2}\right)=\left[\begin{array}{cc}40 x_{1}^{3}+6 x_{2} & 6 x_{1} \\ 6 x_{1} & -6 x_{2}\end{array}\right]$.
(b) $\frac{d}{d x} f(x)=\frac{3 x^{2}+2}{x^{3}+2 x} e^{3 x}+3 \ln \left(x^{3}+2 x\right) e^{3 x}$.
(c) $\int f(x) d x_{2}=\frac{1}{3} x_{1} x_{2}^{3}+\frac{1}{2} x_{1} e^{2 x_{2}}$.
(d) $\frac{d}{d x} \int_{0}^{x}\left(t^{3}+3 x-2\right) d t=x^{3}+6 x-2$.
(e) $\mathbb{E}[X]=3.2, \mathbb{V}[X]=\mathbb{E}\left[X^{2}\right]-\mathbb{E}[X]^{2}=3.36$.
(f) Because we need $\int_{0}^{2} k x^{1.5} d x=1$, we have $k=\frac{5}{8 \sqrt{2}}$. It then follows that $\mathbb{E}[X]=\int_{0}^{2} x f(x) d x=$ $\int_{0}^{2} x^{2.5} \frac{5}{8 \sqrt{2}} d x=\frac{10}{7}$.
(g) Because $\frac{d^{2}}{d x^{2}} f(x)=\frac{15}{4} x^{\frac{1}{2}}+6>0$ over $[0, \infty)$, it is convex over the region.
(h) Because $\frac{d^{2}}{d x^{2}} g(x)=-x^{-2}+4 \geq 0$ if and only if $x \in\left(-\infty,-\frac{1}{2}\right] \cup\left[\frac{1}{2}, \infty\right)$, it is convex over there.
2. (a) As shown in Figure 1, the area in gray is the feasible region. Obviously, it is not a convex set since there exists some points between point $A$ and $B$ that do not belong to the feasible region.


Figure 1: Graphical solution
(b) This program is unbounded, so there is no optimal solution.
(c) Yes, the point $(-\sqrt{3},-1)$ is not a global maximum but a local one since there does not exist any point nearby that is greater than it.
(d) No, there exists no point that is local maximum but not a global maximum.
3. Suppose that there are two points $x$ and $y, x, y \in F \cap G$. Then we know $x, y \in F$ and $x, y \in G$. Since $F$ and $G$ are convex sets it follows that $z \in F$ and $z \in G$ where

$$
z=\lambda x+(1-\lambda) y, \lambda \in[0,1]
$$

Hence $z \in F \cap G$.
4. (a) The problem can be formulated as

$$
\begin{array}{cl}
\max _{p} & \pi(p)=(p-c) a\left(1-\frac{p}{b}\right) \\
\text { s.t. } & 0 \leq p \leq 0
\end{array}
$$

Since $\pi^{\prime \prime}(p)=\frac{-2 a}{b}<0$ and $p \in\left[0, p_{0}\right]$, we maximize a concave function over a convex feasible region. Therefore, the problem is a convex program.
(b) The optimal solution is

$$
p^{*}= \begin{cases}\frac{b+c}{2} & \text { if } \frac{b+c}{2} \leq p_{0} \\ p_{0} & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

(c) $p^{*}$ is increasing in the highest possible valuation $b$, because the seller can charge more when consumers' willingness to pay is higher. $p^{*}$ is increasing in the unit cost $c$, because the seller will try to cover the additional cost by increasing the retail price. $p^{*}$ has nothing to do with the total number of consumer $a$, because the total number of consumer will only affect the total profit but not the retail price.
5. (a) The problem can be formulated as

$$
\begin{array}{cl}
\max _{q} & \pi(q)=r \mathbb{E}[\min \{q, D\}]+d \mathbb{E}[\max \{q-x, 0\}]-c q \\
\text { s.t. } & q \geq 0
\end{array}
$$

(b) First, we may rewrite $\pi(q)$ into

$$
\pi(q)=r\left\{\int_{0}^{q} x f(x) d x+\int_{q}^{\infty} q f(x) d x\right\}+d \int_{0}^{q}(q-x) f(x) d x-c q
$$

We then have

$$
\begin{aligned}
\pi^{\prime}(q) & =r\left\{[q f(q)]+\left[-q f(q)+\int_{q}^{\infty} f(x) d x\right]\right\}+d \int_{0}^{q} f(x) d x-c \\
& =r(1-F(q))+d F(q)-c \\
& =r+(d-r) F(q)-c
\end{aligned}
$$

which implies that the optimal quantity $q^{*}$ satisfies

$$
F\left(q^{*}\right)=\frac{r-c}{r-d}
$$

(c) $F\left(q^{*}\right)$ is increasing in $r$. If the unit revenue increases, the newsvendor will have an incentive to order more quantity. $F\left(q^{*}\right)$ is decreasing in $c$. If the unit cost increases, the newsvendor will choose to order less to avoid from overstocking. $F\left(q^{*}\right)$ is increasing in $d$. If the salvage value increases, the newsvendor will have an incentive to order more because the recycling site shares the risk with him.

