Symbolic Model Checkers

(Based on [Clarke *et al.* 1999])

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Agenda

- Introduction to SMV and NuSMV
- Input Language
- Examples: Mutual Exclusion and FutureBus+
- LTL, CTL, and BMC in NuSMV
- References

Symbolic Model Verifier (SMV)

- SMV is a tool for checking finite state system satisfy specifications in CTL.
- SMV uses the BDD-based symbolic model checking algorithm.
- The first model checker based on BDDs.
- The language component of SMV is used to describe complex finite-state system.
- The primary purpose of the SMV input language is to describe the transition relation of a finite Kripke structure.

NuSMV

- NuSMV is a new symbolic model checker, reimplementation and extension of CMU SMV.
- NuSMV 2 is Open Source and the latest version is NuSMV 2.5.2 (Oct 29, 2010)
- NuSMV allows for the representation of synchronous and asynchronous finite state systems.
- The analysis of specifications expressed in Computation Tree Logic (CTL) and Linear Temporal Logic (LTL), using BDD-based and SAT-based(Mini-Sat) model checking techniques.

NuSMV(cont'd)

- A SMV file includes the input language for description of finite state machine and SPEC formulas that be used to verify our desired properties.
- NuSMV Work flow diagram:



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Important feature of the language

- Modules
  - User can decompose the description of finite-state system into modules.
  - Individual modules can be instantiated multiple times, and modules can reference variables declared in other modules.
  - Modules can have parameters, while may be state components, expressions, or other modules.
  - Modules can also contain fairness constraints.

Important feature of the language(cont'd)

- Synchronous and interleaved composition
  - SMV modules can be composed either synchronously or using interleaving.
  - In a synchronous component, a single step in the composition corresponds to a single step in each of the component.
  - With interleaving, a single step in the composition represents a step by exactly one component. (use keyword process)

Important feature of the language(cont'd)

- Nondeterministic transitions
  - Nondeterminism can reflect actual choice in the actions of the system being modeled, or it can be used to describe a more abstract model.
- Transition relations
  - It can be specified explicitly in terms of boolean relations on the current and next state values of state variables.
  - or implicitly as a set of parallel assignment statements.

A Simple Example

- The following is a simple example that illustrate the basic concepts.

```
MODULE main
VAR
   request : boolean;
   state : {ready, busy};
ASSIGN
   init(state) := ready;
   next(state) := case
                    state = ready & request : busy;
                    TRUE : {ready,busy};
                    esac;
SPEC
   AG(request -> AF state = busy)
```

Types Overview(1/2)

- boolean
- integer
- enumeration
  - symbolic enum
    ex: {stopped, running, waiting}
  - integers-and-symbolic enum
    ex: {-1, 1, waiting}
- word: are used to model vector of bits (booleans) which allow bitwise logical and arithmetic operations
  - unsigned word [•]
  - signed word [•]

Types Overview(2/2)

- array: are declared with a lower and upper bound for the index, and the type of the elements in the array.
  ex: array 0..3 of boolean
  array 1..8 of array -1..2 of unsigned word[5]
- set: are used to identify expressions representing a set of values.
  - boolean set
  - integer set
  - symbolic set
  - integers-and-symbolic set

Expressions(1/4)

- Constant Expressions

```
constant ::boolean_constant
          | integer_constant
          | symbolic_constant
          | word_constant
          | range_constant
```

- `word_constant :: 0 [word_sign_specifier] word_base [word_width] _ word_value`

  `ex: 0sb5_10111 has type signed word[5]`

- `range constant :: integer_number .. integer_number`

Expressions(2/4)

- Basic Expressions

```
basic_expr :: constant
        |variable_identifier
        |define_identifier
        |! basic_expr
        |basic_expr & basic_expr
        |basic_expr | basic_expr
        |basic_expr -> basic_expr
        |basic_expr = basic_expr
        |basic_expr ? basic_expr : basic_expr
        |basic_next_expr
        |case_expr
        |{ set_body_expr }
        ⋮
```

Expressions(3/4)

- Case Expressions

  case_expr ::
  case
  expr_a1 : expr_b1 ;
  expr_a2 : expr_b2 ;
  ⋮
  expr_an : expr_bn ;
  esac

- If-Then-Else Expressions

  ```
  cond_expr ? basic_expr1 : basic_expr2
  ```

Expressions(4/4)

- Set Expressions
  - defining a set of boolean, integer and symbolic enum values
  - there cannot be a set of sets in NuSMV
  - be created with the union operator
  - ```
    set_body_expr :: basic_expr
                   | set_body_expr , basic_expr
    ```

    ex: expression {exp1, exp2, exp3} is equivalent to exp1 **union** exp2 **union** exp3
- Next Expressions
  - refer to the values of variables in the next state
  - `basic_next_expr :: next ( basic_expr )`
    ```

Statement declaration - Variable Declarations

- A variable can be an input, a frozen, or a state variable.
- Type Specifiers

```
type_specifier :: simple_type_specifier
                | module_type_specifier


simple_type_specifier :: boolean
                | word [ basic_expr ]
                | unsigned word [ basic_expr ]
                | signed word [ basic_expr ]
                | { enumeration_type_body }
                | basic_expr .. basic_expr
                | array basic_expr .. basic_expr
                  of simple_type_specifier
```

Statement declaration - Variable Declarations

- State Variables
  - A state of the model is an assignment of values to a set of state and frozen variables.
  - ```
    var_declaration :: VAR var_list
    var_list :: identifier : type_specifier ;
              | var_list identifier : type_specifier ;
    ```
  - Example: `VAR a : {stopped, running, finished};`
- Input Variables
  - IVAR s (input variables) are used to label transitions of the Finite State Machine
  - ```
    ivar_declaration :: IVAR simple_var_list
    simple_var_list :: identifier : simple_type_specifier ;
                     | simple_var_list identifier :
                       simple_type_specifier ;
    ```
  - Example: `IVAR b : {TRUE, FALSE};`

Statement declaration - Variable Declarations

- Frozen Variables
  - FROZENVAR s (frozen variables) are variables that retain their initial value throughout the evolution of the state machine
  - `frozenvar_declaration :: FROZENVAR simple_var_list`
  - Sementic meaning:

    ```
    ASSIGN next(a) := a;
    ```
  - Example:

    ```
    FROZENVAR a : boolean;
    VAR b : boolean;
    ASSIGN
    next(a) := b; -- illegal
    a := b; -- illegal
    ```

Statement declaration - ASSIGN Constraint

```
assign_constraint :: ASSIGN assign_list
assign_list :: assign ;
             | assign_list assign ;
assign :: complex_identifier := simple_expr
        | init ( complex_identifier ) := simple_expr
        | next ( complex_identifier ) := next_expr
```

Statement declaration - ASSIGN Constraint

- Example of **ASSIGN**

```
ASSIGN
init(turn) := 0;
next(turn) :=
case
   turn = turn0 & state0 = critical:!turn;
   TRUE: turn;
esac;
```

Statement declaration

- TRANS Constraint
  - The transition relation of the model is a set of current state/next state pairs
  - The transition relation is the conjunction of all of `TRANS`
  - `trans_constraint :: TRANS next_expr [;]`
- INIT Constraint
  - The set of initial states of the model is determined by a boolean expression under the **INIT**
  - The expression doesn't contain the `next()` operator.
  - The initial set is the conjunction of all of **INIT**
  - `init_constrain :: INIT simple_expr [;]`
- Example:

```
INIT output = 0
TRANS
 next(output)=!input
 | next(output)=output
```

Statement declaration

- INVAR Constraint

  ```
  invar_constraint :: INVAR simple_expr [;]
  ```

  - The set of invariant states can be specified using a boolean expression under the INVAR keyword.
  - The expression doesn't contain the next() operator.
  - The invariant is the conjunction of all of INVAR.
  - Example:

    ```
    INVAR x = y + 1
    ```

Statement declaration

- Semantically assignments can be expressed using other kinds of constraints
  - `ASSIGN` a := exp;
    is equivalent to `INVAR` a = exp;
  - `ASSIGN` init(a) := exp;
    is equivalent to `INIT` a = exp;
  - `ASSIGN` next(a) := exp;
    is equivalent to `TRANS` next(a) = exp;

Statement declaration

- Example of SPEC and FAIRNESS

```
SPEC
AG((s0 = trying) -> AF (s0 = critical))

FAIRNESS !(s0 = critical)
```

Statement declaration

- DEFINE Declarations

```
define_declaration :: DEFINE define_body
define_body :: identifier := simple_expr ;
 | define_body identifier := simple_expr ;
```

- MODULE Declaratios

```
module :: MODULE identifier [( module_parameters )]
          [module_body]
```

Statement declaration

- Example of MODULE and DEFINE

```
MODULE counter_cell(carry_in)
VAR
  value:boolean;
ASSIGN
  init(value):=0;
  next(value):=value+carry_in mod 2;
DEFINE
  carry_out:=value&carry_in;
```

Statement declaration

- References to Module Components
  - Both of variable identifiers and define identifiers are complex identifiers

```
complex_identifier :: identifier
        | complex_identifier . identifier
        | complex_identifier [ simple_expression ]
        | self
```

- A Program and the main Module
  - There must be one module with the name `main` and no formal parameters.

```
program :: module
           | module_list module
```

Statement declaration

- Example of `main` and identifiers.

```
MODULE main
... VAR
  a : bar;
  m : foo(a);
...
MODULE bar
 VAR
  q : boolean;
  p : boolean;
MODULE foo(c)
 DEFINE
  flag := c.q | c.p;
```

Statement declaration

- CTL Specifications

```
ctl_specification :: CTLSPEC ctl_expr [;]
           | SPEC ctl_expr [;]
           | CTLSPEC NAME name := ctl_expr [;]
           | SPEC NAME name := ctl_expr [;]
```

Statement declaration

- A CTL formula has the syntax

```
ctl_expr ::simple_expr
          | ! ctl_expr
          | ctl_expr & ctl_expr
          | ctl_expr | ctl_expr
          | ctl_expr -> ctl_expr
          | ctl_expr <-> ctl_expr
          | EG ctl_expr
          | EX ctl_expr
          | EF ctl_expr
          | AG ctl_expr
          | AX ctl_expr
          | AF ctl_expr
          | E [ ctl_expr U ctl_expr ]
          | A [ ctl_expr U ctl_expr ]
```

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Mutual Exclusion Problem(1/7)

- The goal of this program is to exclude the possibility that both processes are in their critical regions at the same time.
- A process which wants to enter its critical region will eventually be able to enter.
- Each process in one of three region: noncritical, trying, critical.



Mutual Exclusion Problem(2/7)

- Initially, both processes are in their noncritical regions.
- A process is in trying region and the other is in noncritical region, the first process can immediately enter its critical region.
- If both processes are in their trying regions, the boolean variable turn is used to determine which process enters its critical region.
  - if turn = 0 then process 0 can enter and turn := !turn.
  - if turn = 1 then process 1 can enter and turn := !turn.
- We assume that a process must eventually leave its critical region.
- It may remain in its noncritical region forever.

Mutual Exclusion Problem(3/7)



Code of Mutual Exclusion

```
MODULE main --two process mutual exclusion

VAR
s0: {noncritical, trying, critical};
s1: {noncritical, trying, critical};
turn: boolean;
pr0: process prc(s0, s1, turn, 0);
pr1: process prc(s1, s0, turn, 1);

ASSIGN
init(turn) := 0;
```

Mutual Exclusion Problem(4/7)

- Module definitions begin with the keyword `MODULE`.
  - The module main is top-level module. (line 1)
  - The module `prc` has formal parameter `state0`, `state1`, `turn`, `turn0`. (line 19)
- Variables are declared using `VAR`.
  - i.e., `turn` is a boolean variable, while `s0` and `s1` are variables which can have one of three region. (line 3-5)
  - It's also used to instantiate other modules. (line 6-7)
  - The keyword `process` is used in both cases, the global model is constructed by interleaving steps from `pr0` and `pr1`.

Code of Mutual Exclusion(cont'd)

```
MODULE prc(state0, state1, turn, turn0)
ASSIGN
init(state0) := noncritical;
next(state0) :=
 case
 (state0= noncritical):{trying,noncritical};
 (state0= trying)&(state1= noncritical): critical;
 (state0= trying)&(state1= trying)&(turn = turn0):
 critical;
 (state0= critical) : {critical,noncritical};
 1:state0;
 esac;
```

Code of Mutual Exclusion(cont'd)

```
next(turn) :=
case
  turn = turn0 & state0 = critical: !turn;
  1: turn;
esac;
```

Mutual Exclusion Problem(5/7)

- The `ASSIGN` statement is used to define the initial states and transitions of the model.
  - i.e.,the initial value of variable `turn` is 0. (line 9)
  - The value of the variable `state0` and `turn` in the next state is given by the case statement. (line 23-29) (line 31-34)
  - The value of a case statement is determined by evaluating the clauses within the statement in sequence.
  - When a set expression is assigned to a variable, the value of variable is chosen nondeterministically from the set.

Code of Mutual Exclusion(cont'd)

```
FAIRNESS    !(s0 = critical)
FAIRNESS    !(s1 = critical)
SPEC   EF((s0 = critical) & (s1 = critical))
SPEC   AG((s0 = trying) -> AF (s0 = critical))
SPEC   AG((s1 = trying) -> AF (s1 = critical))
SPEC   AG((s0 = critical) -> A[(s0 = critical) U
       (!(s0 = critical) & !E[!(s1 = critical) U
       (s0 = critical)])])
SPEC   AG((s1 = critical) -> A[(s1 = critical) U
       (!(s1 = critical) & !E[!(s0 = critical) U
       (s1 = critical)])])
⋮
FAIRNESS    running
```

Mutual Exclusion Problem(6/7)

- The `FAIRNESS` statements are fairness constrains.
  - Fairness constrains (line10-11) are used to prevent a process remain in its critical region forever.
- The CTL properties to be verified are given as `SPEC` statements.
  - The first specification checks for a violation of the mutual exclusion requirement.(line 12)
  - The second and third check that a process which wants to enter its critical region will eventually be able to enter.(line 13-14)
  - The last two specifications check whether processes must strictly alternate entry into their critical regions.(line 15-17)

Mutual Exclusion Problem(7/7)

- Result:
  - EF((s0 = critical) & (s1 = critical)) is false
  - AG((s0 = trying) -> AF (s0 = critical)) is true
  - AG((s1 = trying) -> AF (s1 = critical)) is true
  - AG((s0 = critical) -> A[(s0 = critical).. is false
  - AG((s1 = critical) -> A[(s1 = critical).. is false
- The output note following:
  - mutual exclusion is not violated,
  - absence of starvation is true,
  - strict alternation of critical region is false.
- SMV produced counterexample computation paths in the false cases.

Counterexample

- Counterexample for strict alternation of critical regions.

```
-- specification AG (s0 = critical -> A(... is false
-- as demonstrated by the following execution sequence
state 2.1: s0 = noncritical
           s1 = noncritical
          turn=0
state 2.2: [executing process pr0]
state 2.3: [executing process pr0]
           s0 = trying
state 2.4: s0 = critical
state 2.5: [executing process pr0]
state 2.6: s0 = noncritical
           turn = 1
state 2.7: [executing process pr0]
state 2.8: [executing process pr0]
           s0 = trying
state 2.9: s0 = critical
```

A Realistic Example: *Futurebus+*

- The formalization and verification of the cache coherence protocol
  - draft IEEE *Futurebus+* standard (IEEE Standard 896.1-1991).
- A precise model of the protocol was constructed in SMV language and model checking was used to show that it satisfied a formal specification of cache coherence.
- A number of errors and ambiguities were discovered.
- This experience demonstrates that hardware description and model checking techniques can be used to help design real industrial standards.

Futurebus+

- *Futurebus+* is a bus architecture for high-performance computers.
- The cache coherence protocol used in *Futurebus+* is required to insure consistency of data in hierarchical systems composed of many processors and caches interconnected by multiple bus segments.
- The model is highly nondeterministic, both to reduce the complexity of verification and to cover allowed design choices.
- The model for the cache coherence protocol consists of 2300 lines of SMV code.

Design of *Futurebus+*

- *Futurebus+* maintains coherence by having the individual caches snoop, or observe, all bus transaction and update their status.
- Coherence across buses is maintained using bus bridges.
- Special agents at the end of the bridges represent remote caches and memories.
- The protocol uses split transaction to increase performance.
- This facility makes it possible to service local requests while remote requests are being processed.

Design of *Futurebus+*(cont'd)

- We are interested in *cache modules* that represents a cache/processor pair and *shared memory modules*.
- Each cache module in the system is required to keep an attribute for the cache line; the attribute represents the read and write access the cache has to the line.
- The attributes specified by the *Futurebus+* protocol are:
  - invalid
  - shared unmodified
  - exclusive unmodified
  - exclusive modified

Design of *Futurebus+*(cont'd)

- The standard defines a number of transactions that relate to the movement of the data lines.
- Read Shared: This transaction is initiated by a cache which wishes to obtain read access to the data line
- Read Modified: is initiated by a cache who wishes to obtain read/write access to the data line
- Invalidate: is initiated by a cache who has read access to the data line and wishes to obtain write access to the line

Design of *Futurebus*+(cont'd)

- Copyback: is initiated by a cache has modified the data line and wishes to evict the line from its memory.
- Shared Response: is initiated by a cache who has forced another module to go into a requester state. This response is sharable, others may snarf it.
- Modified Response: is initiated by a cache has forced another module to go into a requester state. This response is not sharable.

Design of *Futurebus+*(cont'd)

- Transition diagram between line attribute in response to transactions.



Source: Esser."Verification of the Futurebus+ Cache Coherence protocol: A case study in model checking",2003

Design of *Futurebus+*(cont'd)

1. The module completed a read shared transaction that was snarfed by another module, or it has snarfed the completed read shared transaction of another module.
2. Completed a read shared transaction that was not snarfed by another module
3. Completed a read modified transaction
4. The module may voluntarily clear the cache of a line, or the module did not snarf read shared transaction belonging to another module, or another module initiated read modified or invalidate transaction.
5. Completed an invalidate transaction

Design of *Futurebus+*(cont'd)

6. The module may change an exclusive unmodified line to exclusive modified at any time without a bus transaction.
7. The module may change the line state to shared-unmodified without a bus transaction, or the module snarfed the read shared transaction of another module.
8. Removed the line from the cache (after performing a copyback transaction)
9. The module performed a copyback transaction and kept a copy of the line.
10. Removed the line from the cache, or the module did not snarf the read share transaction of another module, or another module initiated a read modified transaction.

Example of *Futurebus+*: Single bus

- We consider some example transactions for a single *cache line* in the two-processor system.
- Initially, neither processor has a copy of the line in its cache.
- All processor are in the invalid state.



Example of *Futurebus+*: Single bus(cont'd)

- P1 issues a read-shared transaction to obtain a readable copy of the data from M(memory).
- P2 snoops this transaction, and it also can obtain a readable copy, this is called snarfing.
- If P2 snarfs, both caches contain a shared-unmodified copy.
- Next, P1 decides to write, and issues an invalidate transaction on the bus.
- P2 snoops this transaction, and delete the copy.
- Final, P1 has an exclusive-modified copy of the data.

Two-bus Example

- Initially, both processor caches are in the invalid state.
- Each processor doesn't have a copy in its cache.



Two-Bus Example(cont'd)

- P2 issues a read-modified to obtain a writable copy, then MA(memory agent) splits the transaction, for it must get the data from M.
- The command is passed to CA(cache agent), and CA issues the read-modified on bus 1.
- M supplies the data to CA, which in turn passes it to MA.
- MA issues a modified-response on bus 2 to complete the split transaction.

Two-Bus Example(cont'd)

- Suppose now that P1 issues a read-shared command.
- CA, knowing that a remote cache has an exclusive-modified copy, intervenes in the transaction to indicate that it will supply the data, and splits the transaction.
- CA passes the read-shared to MA, which issues it.
- P2 intervenes and supplies the data to MA, which passes it to CA.
- CA performs a shared-response transaction which complete the read-shared issued by P1.

Simplifications

- First, a number of the low-level details dealing with how modules communicate were eliminated.
  - The most significant simplification was to use a model in which one step corresponds to one transaction.
- Second, it was used to reduce the size of some parts of the system.
  - E.g., only transactions involving a single cache line were considered.
  - The data were reduced to single bit.

Simplifications(cont'd)

- Third, it involved eliminating the read-invalid and write-invalid commands.
  - These commands are used in DMA transfers to and from memory.
- Last, it involved using nondeterminism to simplify the models of some of the components.
  - Processor are assumed to issue read and write requests for a given cache line nondeterministically.
  - Responses to split transactions are assumed to be issued after arbitrary delays.
  - Finally, the model of a bus bridge is highly nondeterministic.

Cache Model

```
next(state) :=
  case
  CMD=none:
    case
    state=share-unmodified:
      case
      requester=exclusive: share-unmodified;
      1: invalid, shared-unmodified;
      esac;
    state=exclusive-unmodified: invalid, shared-unmodified,
      exclusive-unmodified, exclusive-modified;
    1: state;
    esac;

    ⋮
```

Cache Model(cont'd)

- State components with (CMD, SR, TF) denote bus signals visible to the cache, and components with (state, tf) are under the control of the cache.
- This part specifies what happen when an idle cycle occurs.
- If the cache has a shared-unmodified copy, then the line may be nondeterministically kicked out of the cache unless there is an outstanding request to change the line to exclusive-modified.
- If a cache has an exclusive-unmodified copy of the line, it may kick the line out of the cache or change it to exclusive-modified.

Cache Model(cont'd)

```
master:
  case
  CMD=read-shared:
    case
    state=invalid:
      case
      !SR & !TF: exclusive-unmodified;
      !SR: shared-unmodified;
      1: invalid;
      esac;

      ⋮
  esac;
⋮
```

Cache Model(cont'd)

- This part indicate how the cache line state is updated when the cache issues a read-shared transition.
- This should only happen when the cache doesn't have a copy.
- If the transaction is not split (!SR), then the data will be supplied to the cache.
- Either no other caches will snarf the data (!TF), in which case the cache obtain an exclusive-unmodified copies.
- If the transition is split, the cache line remains in the invalid state.

Cache Model(cont'd)

```
CMD=read-shared:
  case
  state in invalid, shared-unmodified:
    case
    !tf: invalid;
    !SR: shared-unmodified;
    1: state;
    esac;

    ⋮
esac;
```

Cache Model(cont'd)

- This part tells how caches respond when they observe another one issuing a read-shared transaction.
- If the observing cache is either invalid or shared-unmodified, then it may indicate that it doesn't want a copy and the line becomes invalid.
- Alternatively, it may assert `tf` and try to snarf the data. The transaction is not split (!SR) , the cache obtaines a shared-unmodified copy.
- Otherwise, the case stays in it current state.

Specifications

- $\text{AG}(p1.\mathit{writable} \rightarrow \neg p2.\mathit{readable})$
  - If p1 is in the exclusive-modified state, p2 is in invalid.
- $\text{AG}(p1.\mathit{readable} \wedge p2.\mathit{readable} \rightarrow p1.\mathit{data} = p2.\mathit{data})$
  - If two caches have copies ,then they have the same data.
- $\text{AG}(p.\mathit{readable} \wedge \neg m.\mathit{memory\text{-}line\text{-}modified}$ $\rightarrow p.\mathit{data} = m.\mathit{data})$
  - If memory has an up-to-date data, then any cache that has a copy must agree with memory on the data.
- $\text{AG EF } p.\mathit{readable} \wedge \text{AG EF } p.\mathit{writable}$
  - This is used to check that it is always possible for a cache to get read or write access to the line.

Two of the errors

- The first error occurs in the single bus protocol.
- Initially, both caches are invalid.
- P1 obtain an exclusive-unmodified copy.
- Next, P2 issues a read-modified, which P1 splits for invalidation.
- M supplies a copy to P2,which transitions to shared-unmodified.
- At this point, P1,still having an exclusive-unmodified copy, transitions to exclusive-modified and writes the cache line.
- P1 and P2 are inconsistent.
- The bug can be fixed by requiring that P1 transition to the shared-unmodified state when it splits the read-modified for invalidation.

Two of the errors(cont'd)

- The second error occurs in the hierarchical configuration.
- P1, P2, and P3 all obtain share-unmodified copies.



Two of the errors(cont'd)

- P1 issues an invalidate transaction that P2 and MA split.
- P3 issues an invalidate that CA splits.
- The bridge detects that an invalidate-invalidate collision has occurred.
- The collision should be resolved by having MA invalidate P1.
- When MA tries to do this, P2 asserts a busy signal on the bus.
- MA observes this and acquires the requester-waiting attribute.

Two of the errors(cont'd)

- P2 now finishes invalidating and issues a modified-response. This is split by MA because P3 still not invalid.
- However,MA still maintains the requester-waiting attribute.
- MA will not issue commands since it is waiting for a completed response,but no such response can occur.
- There is a deadlock.
- The deadlock can be avoided by having MA clear the requester-waiting attribute when it observe that P2 has finished invalidating.

Agenda

- Introduction to SMV and NuSMV
- Input Language
- Examples: Mutual Exclusion and FutureBus+
- LTL, CTL, and BMC in NuSMV
- References

LTL, CTL, and BMC in NuSMV

- The main purpose of a model checker is to verify that a model satisfies a set of desired properties specified by the user.
- In NuSMV, the specifications to be checked can be expressed in two different temporal logics: the Computation Tree Logic (CTL), and the Linear Temporal Logic (LTL).
- CTL and LTL specifications are evaluated by NuSMV in order to determine their truth or falsity in the FSM
- When a specification is discovered to be false, NuSMV constructs and prints a counterexample.

LTL Statement declaration

- A LTL formula has the syntex

```
LTLexpr ::LTLexpr
          | "!" LTLexpr
          | LTLexpr1 "&" LTLexpr2
          | LTLexpr1 "|" LTLexpr2
          | LTLexpr1 "->" LTLexpr2
          | LTLexpr1 "<->" LTLexpr2
          Furture operators
          | "X" LTLexpr
          | "G" LTLexpr
          | "F" LTLexpr
          | LTLexpr"U" LTLexpr
          | LTLexpr"V" LTLexpr
```

LTL Statement declaration(cont'd)

- A LTL formula has the syntex

  LTLexpr :: Past operators

  | "Y" LTLexpr previous state
  | "Z" LTLexpr before
  | "H" LTLexpr historically
  | "O" LTLexpr once
  | LTLexpr"S" LTLexpr since
  | LTLexpr"T" LTLexpr triggered

Semaphore

- Each process has four state: `idle`, `entering`, `critical` and `exiting`.
- The `entering` state indicate that the process wants to enter its critical region.
- If `semaphore` is 0, it goes to the `critical`, and sets `semaphore` to 1.
- In `exiting` state, the process sets `semaphore` to 0.

Semaphore(cont'd)



Code of Semaphore

```
MODULE main

VAR
semaphore : boolean;
proc1 : process user(semaphore);
proc2 : process user(semaphore);

ASSIGN
init(semaphore) := 0;
```

Code of Semaphore(cont'd)

```
MODULE user(semaphore)
VAR
state : {idle, entering, critical, exiting};
ASSIGN
init(state) := idle;
next(state) :=
case
  state = idle: {idle, entering};
  state = entering & !semaphore: critical;
  state = critical: {critical, exiting};
  state = exiting: idle;
  1: state;
esac;
```

Code of Semaphore(cont'd)

```
next(semaphore) :=
case
  state = entering: 1;
  state = exiting: 0;
  1: semaphore;
esac;

FAIRNESS
running
```

CTL Specification of Semaphore

- `proc1` and `prco2` are not at the same time in the critical state.

  ```
  SPEC
  AG!(proc1.state=critical & proc2.state=critical)
  ```

- If `porc1` wants to enter its critical state, it eventually does.

  ```
  SPEC
  AG(proc1.state=entering -> AF proc1.state=critical)
  ```

LTL Specification of Semaphore

- The two process cannot be in the critical region at the same time.

```
LTLSPEC
G!(proc1.state=critical & proc2.state=critical)
```

- A process wants to enter its critical session, it eventually does.

```
LTLSPEC
G(proc1.state=entering -> F proc1.state=critical)
```

- A process enters its critical session, it once want to do it.

```
LTLSPEC
G(proc1.state=critical -> O proc1.state=entering)
```

Bounded Model Checking in NuSMV

IM NTU

- Instruct NuSMV to run in BMC by using command-line option `-bmc`
- In BMC mode NuSMV tries to find a counterexample of increasing length, and immediately stops when it succeeds, declaring that the formula is false.
- If the maximum number of iterations is reached and no counterexample is found, then NuSMV exits, and the truth of the formula is not decided.
- The maximum number of iterations can be controlled by using bmc_length.
- The default value is 10.

Example of Bounded Model Checking

```
MODULE main

VAR
    y : 0..15;
ASSIGN
    init(y) := 0;
TRANS
case
  y = 7 : next(y) = 0;
  1     : next(y) = ((y + 1) mod 16);
esac
```

Checking LTL Specifications with BMC

- Check the following LTL specification with BMC

```
LTLSPEC G ( y=4 -> X y=6 )
 False

LTLSPEC !G F (y = 2)
 False

LTLSPEC F ( X y=8 | O y<3)
 This formula can't be decided within 10 iterations
```

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Reference

- Clarke *et al.*,*"Model Checking Ch. 8"*, 1999.
- K.L. McMillan, *"The SMV system"*, 2000.
- Roberto *et al.*,*"NuSMV 2.5 Tutorial"*, 2010
- Roberto *et al.*,*"NuSMV 2.5 User Manual"*, 2010
- Clarke *et al.*,*"Verification of the Futurebus+ Cache Coherence Protocol"*, 1995.
- Robert Esser ,*"Verification of the Futurebus+ Cache Coherence protocol: A case study in model checking"*, 2003.